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ABSTRACT 
 An international arbitration tribunal may not employ the 
same tools as a national court may to convince a party before it to 
produce unfavorable evidence. For example, a tribunal may not 
hold a party in contempt, or (in all cases) impose monetary sanc-
tions on a party. Lacking these coercive powers, tribunals increas-
ingly rely on adverse inferences to incentivize a party to produce 
unfavorable evidence: in other words, tribunals threaten to infer 
that withheld evidence is unfavorable to the withholding party's 
case. 
Adverse inferences are very effective in deterring a party from 
withholding evidence in litigation.  This Comment analyzes 
whether they are as effective a deterrent in international arbitration 
proceedings.  It does so by identifying the factors that contribute to 
the potency of adverse inferences in litigation, and investigating 
the extent to which these factors have been replicated in select in-
ternational arbitration cases.  
The results of the inquiry are that adverse inferences are not as 
effective a deterrent to nonproduction in international arbitration 
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as they are in litigation.  While juries often infer the worst on a giv-
given issue and even make inferences regarding the recalcitrant 
party's entire case, arbitrators confine their adverse inferences to 
the specific issue to which the withheld evidence pertained, and do 
not even infer the worst regarding this specific issue.  While 
adverse inferences can lead to punitive damages against the 
withholding party in litigation, they rarely do in arbitration. 
Finally, a party who withholds evidence in litigation must 
convince both a jury and an appellate court that no adverse 
inference is warranted, while a withholding party in arbitration 
must convince only one arbitral tribunal. 
Therefore, the qualitative analysis suggests that a party that 
withholds evidence is more likely to win in international 
arbitration than in litigation if an adverse inference is drawn 
against it. Thus, adverse inferences are less of a deterrent to 
nonproduction in international arbitration as they are in litigation. 
 
  
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol38/iss1/5
  
2016] ADVERSE INFERENCES IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 243 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
1. Introduction ................................................................................244 
2. Definition of Adverse Inferences .............................................247 
3.   Adverse Inferences As the Arbitrators’ Main 
Tool ..............................................................................................248 
4.   Adverse Inferences in Litigation .............................................251 
4.1. Jury’s Imagination .................................................................252 
4.2. Punitive Damages .................................................................254 
4.3. Reversibility ...........................................................................256 
4.4. Observations on Litigation and Arbitration ..........................257 
5. Adverse Inferences in International Arbitration ...................259 
5.1. Factfinder: Arbitrators are not Jurors ...................................259 
 5.1.1 Arbitrators’ Confined and Narrow Inferences .............259 
 5.1.2 The Necessity of Direct Evidence .................................265 
 5.1.3 Familiarity with the Tribunal ......................................266 
5.2. The Absence of Punishment ..................................................269 
5.3. Finality of Arbitration Awards .............................................271 
6. Conclusion .................................................................................272 
  
  
  
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2016
  
244 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. [Vol. 38:1 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Counsel for parties in international arbitration face market 
pressures to do what is necessary to help their clients win.1  More-
over, arbitrators lack the coercive powers that national courts have 
to compel proper behavior and sanction misconduct by counsel 
and parties.  These two realities create the risk that counsel may 
advise parties not to produce unfavorable documentary or testi-
monial evidence, even in the face of an order from the arbitral tri-
bunal mandating such production.  This risk poses a problem not 
only for the integrity of a particular international arbitration pro-
ceeding, but also for the reputation of international arbitration 
generally as a just means of resolving disputes.   
To counter this risk and incentivize production by parties, arbi-
trators have in recent years frequently borrowed a technique from 
common law courts: the adverse inference.2  In other words, arbi-
trators infer that evidence that is withheld without sufficient justi-
fication is unfavorable to the withholding party.  This practice has 
been endorsed both by new institutional rules that explicitly au-
thorize tribunals to draw adverse inferences,3 and by national 
                                                     
1 See KATHERINE L. LYNCH, THE FORCES OF ECONOMIC GLOBALIZATION: 
CHALLENGES TO THE REGIME OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 112 n.166 
(2003) (“International commercial arbitration is an extremely competitive market 
involving big business and ‘mega-lawyering.’”); see also Edna Sussman, The Arbi-
trator Survey—Practices, Preferences and Changes on the Horizon, 26 AM. REV. INT’L 
ARB. 517, 517 (2015) (“Arbitration counsel want to win.”). 
2 See IBA WORKING PARTY, COMMENTARY ON THE NEW IBA RULES OF EVIDENCE 
IN INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, 2 BUS. L. INT’L 16, 36 (2000) (noting 
how arbitral tribunals “routinely create such inferences in current practice”). 
3 See, e.g., IBA Guidelines on Party Representation in International Arbitra-
tion (2013) art. 26(b), http://www.ibanet.org/Document/Default.aspx?
DocumentUid=6F0C57D7-E7A0-43AF-B76E-714D9FE74D7F [https://perma.cc/
LV4X-YEBC] (“If the Arbitral Tribunal, after giving the Parties notice and a rea-
sonable opportunity to be heard, finds that a Party Representative has committed 
Misconduct, the Arbitral Tribunal, as appropriate, may … draw appropriate infer-
ences in assessing the evidence relied upon … the Party Representative ….”); see 
also IBA Rules on the Taking of Evidence in International Arbitration (2010) arts. 
9(5), http://www.ibanet.org/Document/Default.aspx?DocumentUid=68336C49-
4106-46BF-A1C6-A8F0880444DC [https://perma.cc/725W-HUWH] (“If a Party 
fails without satisfactory explanation to produce any Document requested in a 
Request to Produce to which it has not objected in due time or fails to produce 
any Document ordered to be produced by the Arbitral Tribunal, the Arbitral Tri-
bunal may infer that such document would be adverse to the interests of that Par-
ty.”).  For an example of institutional rules that implicitly allow an arbitral tribu-
nal to make adverse inferences, see ICSID Rules of Procedure for Arbitration 
Proceedings (2006) r. 34(3), https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/StaticFiles/
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courts that have confirmed4 or refused to set-aside5 awards made 
in proceedings in which arbitrators drew adverse inferences.6 
This Comment investigates the extent to which adverse infer-
ences actually deter parties from withholding unfavorable evi-
dence in international arbitration proceedings.  It does so by identi-
fying the factors that have made adverse inferences a potent 
deterrent to nonproduction in litigation, and investigating whether 
these factors played a role in certain international arbitration cases 
where a party was faced with the choice either to produce evidence 
or have an adverse inference drawn against it.7 
This inquiry fills gaps in the existing literature on adverse in-
                                                                                                                        
basicdoc/CRR_English-final.pdf [https://perma.cc/78KV-EM75] (“The parties 
shall cooperate with the Tribunal in the production of the evidence …. The Tribu-
nal shall take formal note of the failure of a party to comply with its obligations 
under this paragraph and of any reasons given for such failure.”).  For an example 
of a non-binding source of authority, see UNCITRAL Notes on Organizing Arbi-
tral Proceedings (1996) ¶ 51, https://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/
arbitration/arb-notes/arb-notes-e.pdf [https://perma.cc/RW3V-KJTC] (“The ar-
bitral tribunal may wish to establish time‑limits for the production of documents.  
The parties might be reminded that, if the requested party duly invited to produce 
documentary evidence fails to do so within the established period of time, with-
out showing sufficient cause for such failure, the arbitral tribunal is free to draw 
its conclusions from the failure and may make the award on the evidence before 
it.”). 
4 See, e.g., Bundesgericht [BGer] [Federal Supreme Court] Mar. 28, 2007 II 
ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES SCHWIEZERISCHEN BUNDESGERICHTS [BGE] 4A 2 (Switz.), 
http://www.polyreg.ch/bgeunpub/Jahr_2007/Entscheide_4A_2007/4A.2__2007.
html [https://perma.cc/Q3JT-L5ZA]. 
5 See, e.g., United Mexican States v. Karpa, [2005] 193 O.A.C. 216 (Can. Ont. 
C.A.),  http://www.ontariocourts.ca/decisions/2005/january/C41169.htm 
[https://perma.cc/W4ZC-2LT8]. 
6 Moreover, to the best of the author’s knowledge, no court has ever held that 
arbitrators violated due process or public policy when they drew adverse infer-
ences.  Indeed, no such cases can be found on the website that aggregates deci-
sions regarding the enforcement of arbitral awards.  See Topic List of Court Deci-
sions on the New York Convention Cases, N.Y. ARB. CONVENTION, 
http://www.newyorkconvention.org/court-decisions/list-of-topics-decisions-
per-topic?508/0/0/0#508 (last visited Mar. 3, 2016) [https://perma.cc/59Z9-
SHWW].  But see William Park, A Fair Fight: Professional Guidelines in International 
Arbitration, 30 ARB. INT’L 409, 422 (2014) (“Adverse inferences remain theoretically 
possible, but pose a serious risk to award enforcement due to the possibility that 
they will appear to the recognition forum as a breach of due process.”).  
7 The relevant cases are those where a tribunal ordered a party to produce 
evidence, because there is “[n]o duty to voluntarily disclose adverse evidence [in 
international arbitration].”  NATHAN D O’MALLEY, RULES OF EVIDENCE IN 
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION: AN ANNOTATED GUIDE § 3.14 (2012).  Indeed, 
“[f]ailure to voluntarily (eg, without an order from the tribunal) disclose evidence 
adverse to a party’s position is not a violation of … generally accepted interna-
tional arbitration procedure.”  Id. 
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ferences.  Existing scholarship on the topic has synthesized the 
procedural and substantive preconditions to an adverse inference,8 
discussed the relationship between adverse inferences and the 
burden of proof,9 and investigated the willingness by tribunals to 
draw adverse inferences.10  But it has not analyzed the effect of (po-
tential) adverse inferences on parties’ production decisions.  In-
deed, critiquing tribunals’ reluctance to draw adverse inferences,11 
such works have commented that 
a very important aspect of adverse inferences is their deter-
rent effect.  In order to ensure compliance with orders in 
general, parties should be made to feel genuinely concerned 
that if they do not produce relevant documents without a 
properly proved, plausible excuse, then the case could turn 
against them for that reason.  The benefit of this deterrent effect 
is seriously diluted if arbitrators are reputed to skirt around ra-
ther than deal head on with adverse inference issues.12 
This question—the extent, if any, of the deterrent effect of ad-
verse inferences—is precisely the subject of this inquiry.   
                                                     
8 See, e.g., Jeremy K. Sharpe, Drawing Adverse Inferences from the Non-
production of Evidence, 22 ARB. INT’L 549 (2006).  Sharpe extracts the following pre-
conditions from an impressive survey of case-law of the Iran–United States 
Claims Tribunal: 
the party seeking the adverse inference must produce all available evi-
dence corroborating the inference sought; 
the requested evidence must be accessible to the inference opponent; 
the inference sought must be reasonable, consistent with facts in the rec-
ord and logically related to the likely nature of the evidence withheld; 
the part seeking the adverse inference must produce prima facie evidence; 
and 
the inference opponent must know, or have reason to know, of its obliga-
tion to produce evidence rebutting the adverse inference sought. 
Id. at 551. 
9 See, e.g., Vera van Houtte, Adverse Inferences in International Arbitration, in 
WRITTEN EVIDENCE AND DISCOVERY IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION: NEW ISSUES 
AND TENDENCIES 195 (Alexis Mourre & Teresa Giovannini eds. 2009). 
10 See Simon Greenberg & Felix Lautenschlager, Adverse Inferences in Interna-
tional Arbitral Practice, in INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION AND INTERNATIONAL 
COMMERCIAL LAW: SYNERGY, CONVERGENCE AND EVOLUTION 179 (Stefan Michael 
Kröll, Loukas A. Mistelis et al. eds., 2011). 
11 Id.; see also GARY BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 2391–92 
(2d ed. 2014) (suggesting that tribunals appear “hesitant, sometimes overly hesi-
tant” to draw adverse inferences). 
12 Greenberg & Lautenschlager, supra note 10, at 205 (emphasis added). 
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 The result of the inquiry is that adverse inferences do not 
have the same deterrent impact on arbitrating parties as they do on 
litigating parties.  Arbitrators are less likely to draw the sweeping 
and damaging inferences that juries draw.  Parties that have re-
fused to comply with a tribunal’s order to produce evidence have 
then prevailed in their arbitrations, benefiting from the limited na-
ture of the inference that the tribunals went on to draw.  Moreover, 
the other factors that make an adverse inference a powerful deter-
rent to non-production in litigation—the possibilities that an ad-
verse inference may lead to an award of punitive damages, and 
that the factfinder’s failure to draw an adverse inference against 
the prevailing party will be successfully targeted on appeal—do 
not apply in arbitration.   
The argument proceeds as follows:  Part 1 defines adverse in-
ferences; Part 2 illustrates that adverse inferences are the main 
tools tribunals use to incentivize production by parties; Part 3 ex-
plains the strength of adverse inferences in litigation; and Part 4 
analyzes international investor–state and commercial arbitrations 
where non-producing parties have been warned of the possibility 
of an adverse inference being drawn against them.   
 
2. DEFINITION OF ADVERSE INFERENCES 
 
Adverse inferences are an evidentiary rule allowing for the cre-
ation of indirect evidence.13  In making an adverse inference, the 
factfinder considers a party’s non-production of evidence to be in-
direct evidence of a fact, for which the party refuses to produce di-
rect evidence.  For example, the claimant in an arbitration may ar-
gue that goods that the respondent delivered to it for resale were of 
poor quality, and the respondent may refuse to produce results of 
quality control tests the respondent had done for the goods.  The 
factfinder can then infer, or consider this non-production to be in-
direct evidence of, the fact that the goods were of poor quality 
(whereas direct evidence of the goods’ poor quality would be the 
test results themselves).14   
                                                     
13 Id. at 187; see also van Houtte, supra note 9, at 195, 197–98. 
14 See also Adverse Inference, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 847 (9th ed. 2009) (de-
fining adverse inference as “[a] detrimental conclusion drawn by the fact-finder 
from a party’s failure to produce evidence that is within the party’s control”).  As 
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There are two important consequences flowing from the con-
cept that adverse inferences are an evidentiary rule.  First, an ad-
verse inference is not preclusion.  The factfinder does not automat-
ically decide the issue against the non-producing party; rather, it 
weighs the indirect evidence of non-production against any other 
evidence on the issue.  Second, indirect evidence may inherently 
carry “reduced evidential weight” compared to direct evidence.15  
Thus, for example, if the claimant in the above hypothetical had 
made representations to its customers that the goods were of prop-
er quality, this direct evidence may overcome the indirect evidence 
of the non-produced tests.   
 
3.  ADVERSE INFERENCES AS THE ARBITRATORS’ MAIN TOOL 
 
 “[A]rbitration is not a process of the State.”16  An arbitral tri-
bunal is not part of the judiciary of a state; it obtains the authority 
to adjudicate a dispute not from a statute, but from an agreement 
between the disputing parties to grant it jurisdiction.17  Therefore, 
unlike national courts, arbitrators do not have at their disposal the 
coercive powers of a state that they can use in order to compel a re-
calcitrant party to produce evidence.18  In this way, an international 
arbitral tribunal is similarly hamstrung as other adjudicatory bod-
                                                                                                                        
will be seen infra, a critical question is how broad a detrimental conclusion the 
factfinder will draw. 
15 See van Houtte, supra note 9, at 198; see also infra, subsection IV(A)(2). 
16 Geoffrey M. Beresford Hartwell, Arbitration and the Sovereign Power, 17 J. 
INT’L ARB. 11, 13 (2000). 
17 See Gary V. McGowan, Sanctions in US and International Arbitrations: Old 
Law in Modern Context, KLUWER ARB. BLOG (Oct. 10, 2013), 
http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/blog/2013/10/10/sanctions-in-us-and-
international-arbitrations-old-law-in-modern-context/ [https://perma.cc/R23G-
XEBV] (“An arbitrator’s procedural power derives from private contract, not pub-
lic law.”). 
18 See Sharpe, supra note 8, at 549 (noting that arbitrators lack “imperium”). 
Compare FED. R. CIV. P. 37(a)(1) (allowing parties litigating in a federal American 
court to move for an order compelling disclosure or discovery).  However, juris-
dictions that have adopted the UNCITRAL Model Law provide that courts may 
assist arbitral tribunals in collecting evidence.  See UNCITRAL Model Law on In-
ternational Commercial Arbitration (1985, rev’d 2006) art. 27, https://
www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/ml-arb/07-86998_Ebook.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/3ZQX-U2V2] (“The arbitral tribunal or a party with the ap-
proval of the arbitral tribunal may request from a competent court of this State 
assistance in taking evidence.  The court may execute the request within its com-
petence and according to its rules on taking evidence.”). 
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ies that are not part of a coercive national state apparatus, such as 
the International Court of Justice.19 
Thus, arbitrators are left with three different measures they 
may take in order to deter a party from withholding evidence.  
They may (1) impose monetary sanctions on the party, (2) require 
the party to bear the costs of the arbitration and the other side’s le-
gal fees, and/or (3) draw an adverse inference against the party.  
The third option—the adverse inference—enjoys legal legitimacy 
and practical effectiveness that the first and second options respec-
tively do not.   
 It is far from clear that arbitrators have authority to impose 
monetary sanctions.  Neither institutional rules20 nor the 
UNCITRAL Model Law21 explicitly grants them such power.  In-
deed, given the public character of such sanctions, leading treatises 
caution private arbitrators to “exercise particular care” in imposing 
them.22 
 By contrast, the problem with an award of costs and legal 
fees lies not in its legal legitimacy, but in its practical effectiveness 
as a deterrent.  Arbitrators are authorized under various institu-
tional rules and national arbitration statutes to require a recalci-
                                                     
19 The International Court of Justice is empowered to make “all arrangements 
connected with the taking of evidence.”  Statute of the International Court of Jus-
tice art. 48, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, 33 U.N.T.S. 993.  But such powers do not 
include the power to compel parties in a case before it to produce evidence.  Ra-
ther, “the Court may, even before the hearing begins, call upon agents to produce 
any document or to supply any explanations. Formal note shall be taken of any re-
fusal.”  Id. at art. 49 (emphases added).  See also Michael P. Scharf & Margaux Day, 
The International Court of Justice’s Treatment of Circumstantial Evidence and Adverse 
Inferences, 13 CHI. J. INT’L L. 123, 123 (2012) (“The ICJ, however, has limited ability 
to compel production of evidence and instead often relies either on a compromis 
containing agreed factual stipulations or on documentary dossiers submitted by 
each of the parties.”). 
20 Neither the ICSID, UNCITRAL, LCIA, ICDR nor ICC rules explicitly or 
implicitly grant tribunals the authority to impose monetary sanctions.  However, 
other rules may be read as implicitly granting this power.  See, e.g., IBA Guide-
lines on Party Representation, supra note 3, art. 26(d) (“If the Arbitral Tribunal, 
after giving the Parties notice and a reasonable opportunity be heard, finds that a 
Party Representative has committed Misconduct, the Arbitral Tribunal, as appro-
priate, may . . . (d) take any other appropriate measure in order to preserve the 
fairness and integrity of the proceedings.”). 
21 See UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, supra 
note 18. 
22 BORN, supra note 11, at 2315 n.1055; see also JEFF WAINCYMER, PROCEDURE 
AND EVIDENCE IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 879 (2012) (“Penal costs sanctions 
are not applied in international arbitration.”). 
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trant party to pay costs and legal fees.23  Yet, a party would much 
rather pay the costs of an arbitration that it was able to win because 
it withheld damaging evidence, than split the costs of an arbitra-
tion that it lost because it produced such evidence.24  Thus it is un-
likely that the prospect of paying costs and fees would sufficiently 
deter a party from withholding unfavorable evidence.   
 Adverse inferences do not have either of these problems.  As 
to legality, it is “unanimously recognized by scholars and case 
law” that tribunals have the power to draw them.25  As to practical 
effectiveness, by inferring the fact for which a recalcitrant party 
                                                     
23 See, e.g., LCIA Arbitration Rules (2014) art. 28.4, http://www.lcia.org/
Dispute_Resolution_Services/lcia-arbitration-rules-2014.aspx [https://perma.cc/
5MVW-22QN] (“The Arbitral Tribunal shall make its decisions on both Arbitra-
tion Costs and Legal Costs on the general principle that costs should reflect the 
parties' relative success and failure in the award or arbitration or under different 
issues, except where it appears to the Arbitral Tribunal that in the circumstances 
the application of such a general principle would be inappropriate under the Ar-
bitration Agreement or otherwise.  The Arbitral Tribunal may also take into ac-
count the parties’ conduct in the arbitration, including any co-operation in facili-
tating the proceedings as to time and cost and any non-co-operation resulting in 
undue delay and unnecessary expense.  Any decision on costs by the Arbitral Tri-
bunal shall be made with reasons in the award containing such decision.”); see also 
IBA Guidelines on Party Representation in International Arbitration (2013) art. 
26(c), http://www.ibanet.org/Document/Default.aspx?DocumentUid=6F0C
57D7-E7A0-43AF-B76E-714D9FE74D7F [https://perma.cc/D92M-XE63] (“If the 
Arbitral Tribunal, after giving the Parties notice and a reasonable opportunity to 
be heard, finds that a Party Representative has committed Misconduct, the Arbi-
tral Tribunal, as appropriate, may … (c) consider the Party Representative’s Mis-
conduct in apportioning the costs of the arbitration ….”); see also IBA Rules on the 
Taking of Evidence in International Arbitration (2010) arts. 9(7), http://
www.ibanet.org/Document/Default.aspx?DocumentUid=68336C49-4106-46BF-
A1C6-A8F0880444DC [https://perma.cc/AZ36-AWEM] (“If the Arbitral Tribunal 
determines that a Party has failed to conduct itself in good faith in the taking of 
evidence, the Arbitral Tribunal may, in addition to any other measures available 
under these Rules, take such failure into account in its assignment of the costs of 
the arbitration, including costs arising out of or in connection with the taking of 
evidence.”); see also UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules (rev’d 2010) art. 42(1) (“The 
costs of the arbitration shall in principle be borne by the unsuccessful party or 
parties. However, the arbitral tribunal may apportion each of such costs between 
the parties if it determines that apportionment is reasonable, taking into account 
the circumstances of the case.”).  
24 See Greenberg & Lautenschlager, supra note 10, at 203 – 04. 
25 ALAIN HOSANG, OBSTRUCTIONIST BEHAVIOR IN INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL 
ARBITRATION: LEGAL ANALYSIS AND MEASURES AVAILABLE TO THE ARBITRAL 
TRIBUNAL 148 (2014).  For institutional rules that authorize adverse inferences, see 
supra note 3.  For an example of national arbitration statutes that explicitly author-
ize them, see Arbitration Act, 1996, c. 23, § 41(7)(b) (Eng.) (“If a party fails to com-
ply with any other kind of peremptory order, then … the tribunal may … draw 
such adverse inferences from the act of non-compliance as the circumstances justi-
fy ….”). 
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withheld direct proof, an adverse inference seeks to put the parties 
in the position they would have been in had the recalcitrant party 
actually produced the withheld evidence,26 thereby undoing any 
advantage the recalcitrant party may have gotten from withhold-
ing.27  For this reason, tribunals28 and scholars29 consider adverse 
inferences to be the arbitrator’s best available tool in incentivizing 
parties to comply with its production orders.  Determining wheth-
er this tool is effective in practice is therefore critical to determining 
whether a tribunal will be able to obtain all relevant direct evi-
dence in an arbitration.   
 
4.  ADVERSE INFERENCES IN LITIGATION 
 
Adverse inferences are a particularly powerful deterrent to 
non-production in litigation because of three factors.  First, they 
leave the non-producing party at the mercy of the jury’s imagina-
tion.  Second, they may cause the factfinder to consider the party’s 
non-production to have been motivated by a culpable state of 
mind, which may lead to punitive damages.  And third, the possi-
bility that a reviewing court may draw an adverse inference, or in-
validate the conclusions of the factfinder in the lower court that 
failed to draw one, reduce the likelihood that the non-producing 
                                                     
26 See Rimkus Consulting Grp., Inc. v. Cammarata, 688 F. Supp. 3d 598, 618 
(S.D. Tex. 2010) (“A measure of the appropriateness of a sanction is whether it ‘re-
store[s] the prejudiced party to the same position he would have been in absent 
the wrongful destruction of evidence by the opposing party.’” (quoting West v. 
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 167 F.3d 776, 779 (2d Cir. 1999))). 
27 See MARGARET KOESEL, DAVID A. BELL ET AL., SPOLIATION OF EVIDENCE: 
SANCTIONS AND REMEDIES FOR DESTRUCTION OF EVIDENCE IN CIVIL LITIGATION 36 
(2000) (naming “remediation” as a goal, along with deterrence and punishment, 
of adverse inferences); Wm. Grayson Lambert, Keeping the Inference in the Adverse 
Inference Instruction: Ensuring the Instruction is an Effective Sanction in Electronic Dis-
covery Cases, 64 S.C. L. Rev. 682, 686 (2013) (“The instruction serves three purpos-
es: to punish, deter, and remedy.”). 
28 See, e.g., Waste Mgmt., Inc. v. Mex., ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/00/3, Proce-
dural Order Concerning Disclosure of Documents (Oct. 1, 2002) ¶ 6, 
http://www.naftaclaims.com/disputes/mexico/Waste/WasteProceduralOrderD
ocProd1.pdf [https://perma.cc/CNT6-Q8TR] (“The ultimate sanction for nondis-
closure is the drawing of an adverse inference.”). 
29 See, e.g., DURWARD V. SANDIFER, EVIDENCE BEFORE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS 
147 (1975) (deeming the threat of an adverse inference to be the “most effective 
sanction” tribunals have at their disposal). 
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party will ultimately profit from its non-production.   
 
4.1  Jury’s Imagination 
 In a landmark case on spoliation, Judge Scheindlin por-
trayed the damage a jury armed with an adverse inference instruc-
tion could inflict on a party that refused to produce evidence:  
An adverse inference instruction often ends litigation.  .  .  .  
The in terrorem effect of an adverse inference is obvious.  
When a jury is instructed that it may ‘infer that the party 
who destroyed potentially relevant evidence did so out of a 
realization that the [evidence was] unfavorable,’ the party 
suffering this instruction will be hard-pressed to prevail on 
the merits.30 
Indeed, because of the essentially dispositive effect of adverse 
inference instructions, commentators have warned that courts 
should not issue them lightly.31  
The reason for the potential damage of adverse inferences is 
twofold, both having to do with “jurors [and] their unfettered im-
aginations.”32  First, jurors may infer facts on the specific issue to 
which the withheld evidence pertains that are much worse than 
the actual contents of the withheld evidence.  Second, they may 
make inferences beyond the specific issue, regarding the non-
producing party’s entire case or culpability.33 
 Adverse inference instructions historically have entitled ju-
ries to infer the worst about the specific issue to which the with-
held evidence pertains.  The first ever known adverse inference in-
struction was given in the famous English case Armory v. Delamirie, 
in which the defendant goldsmith removed stones from a stolen 
                                                     
30 Laura Zubulake v. UBS Warburg, 220 F.R.D. 212, 219 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
31 See Lambert, supra note 27 (suggesting that courts should not issue an ad-
verse inference instruction unless there has been a finding that the party who 
withheld or destroyed evidence did so in bad faith). 
32 Peter D. Hardy & Matthew T. Newcomer, Parallel Proceedings and the Perils 
of the Adverse Inference, J. HEALTH & LIFE SCI. L., July 2009, at 241, 250. 
33 See Caitlin Haney, Spoliation of Electronic Data Results in Severe Sanctions, 
LITIG. NEWS (Nov. 5, 2013), https://apps.americanbar.org/litigation/
litigationnews/top_stories/110513-spoliation-electronic-data.html 
[https://perma.cc/HPZ8-5FUJ] (“[An adverse inference instruction] leaves the 
jury free to judge the culpability of a person who destroyed documents in the 
middle of litigation. . . . [T]he jury is [also] given free rein to imagine which doc-
uments were destroyed.”).   
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jewel that the plaintiff child had brought him.34  After finding the 
defendant liable for trover,35 the court instructed the jurors that, on 
the issue of compensation to the child, “unless the defendant did 
produce the jewel, and shew it not to be of the finest water, they 
should presume the strongest against him, and make the value of the 
best jewels the measure of their damages.”36  Thus, even though 
the jewels may in reality have been only of medium quality, the ju-
ry could infer that they were of “best” quality.   
Today, not much has changed in terms of the damaging infer-
ences courts allow juries to draw.  In the newsworthy Apple, Inc. v. 
Samsung Electronics, Co. patent infringement litigation, Samsung 
failed to ensure that its employees, including those who designed 
the allegedly infringing products, suspended their computers’ au-
tomatic bi-weekly deletion of emails.37  The court instructed the ju-
ry to presume that relevant information favorable to Apple had 
been deleted as a result.38  It then advised, “Whether this finding is 
important to you in reaching a verdict in this case is for you to de-
cide.  You may choose to find it determinative, somewhat determi-
native, or not at all determinative in reaching your verdict.”39  
Granted such wide discretion, the jury was free to make a “deter-
minative” inference as to liability and make the most incriminating 
inference possible; for example, it could infer that the lost emails 
contained Samsung’s plans to copy Apple’s designs.  Thus, adverse 
inference instructions allow juries to use their imaginations to infer 
the worst on a specific issue, whether damages as in Armory, or lia-
bility as in Apple.   
 Adverse inference instructions may also lead juries to make 
inferences beyond the issue to which the withheld evidence per-
tains.  Juries may infer, for example, that the withholding party’s 
whole case is baseless.  As warned by Wigmore, non-production 
may be  
receivable against [the withholding party] as an indication 
of his consciousness that his case is a weak or unfounded one; 
                                                     
34  (1722) 93 Eng. Rep. 664 (K.B.). 
35 Trover is defined as, “A common-law action for the recovery of damages 
for the conversion of personal property, the damages generally being measured 
by the property’s value.”  Trover, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1647 (10th ed. 2014). 
36 Armory, supra note 34 at 664 (emphasis added). 
37 881 F.Supp.2d 1132, 1138, 1145 (2012). 
38 Id. at 1150. 
39 Id. at 1153. 
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and from that consciousness may be inferred the fact itself 
of the cause’s lack of truth and merit.  The inference thus 
does not necessarily apply to any specific fact in the cause, 
but operates, indefinitely though strongly, against the whole 
mass of alleged facts constituting his cause.40 
Jurors may also make inferences about the negative character 
of the non-producing party; the risk then is that the jurors predis-
pose themselves against the party because of their inferences about 
the party’s character, rather than about the facts of the case.  This 
risk is particularly great when individuals facing both criminal and 
civil proceedings invoke their Fifth Amendment right against self-
incriminating testimony41 in the civil suit.42  This risk also exists in 
cases that do not involve any criminal elements.  For example, if a 
plaintiff in a products liability case destroys or refuses to produce 
the allegedly defective product, jurors will likely respond to an ad-
verse inference instruction “not by reference to what they think 
about … the probability of defect … but rather by reference to the 
immorality of plaintiff’s behavior in destroying the evidence.”43  
The jury may then harbor a desire to “impose swift punishment 
[on the immoral plaintiff], with a certain poetic justice, [without] 
concern over the niceties of proof.”44  Thus, a party in litigation that 
withholds evidence on one specific issue runs the risk that the jury 
will infer the worst not only about that specific issue, but also 
about the party’s whole case and character.  Such a party can relia-
bly predict defeat.   
 
4.2 Punitive Damages 
 
 Worse still, an adverse inference instruction may allow the 
jury to infer conduct or culpability on the part of the non-
                                                     
40 2 JOHN H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIAL AT COMMON LAW § 278 (James H. 
Chadbourn ed., rev. ed. 1979) (emphases added). 
41 See U.S. CONST. AMEND. V (“No person … shall be compelled in any crimi-
nal case to be a witness against himself.”). 
42 See Hardy & Newcomer, supra note 32, at 244, 250–51 (suggesting that fre-
quent invocations foster a perception that real misconduct has occurred). 
43 Dale A. Nance, Adverse Inferences about Adverse Inferences: Restructuring Ju-
ridical Roles for Responding to Evidence Tampering by Parties to Litigation, 90 B.U. L. 
REV. 1089, 1101 (2010). 
44 MCCORMICK’S HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 273, at 661 (Edward 
W. Cleary ed., 2d ed. 1972). 
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producing party that could make the non-producing party liable 
for punitive damages.  For example, in Smith v. Slifer Smith & 
Frampton/Vail Associates Real Estate, LLC,45 forensic analysis re-
vealed that the defendant had wiped clean its hard drives a few 
days before they were to be inspected by the plaintiff’s lawyer.46  
The court granted an adverse inference instruction that the de-
stroyed evidence would have been unfavorable to the defendant,47 
and also permitted the plaintiff to amend its complaint to add a 
claim for punitive damages “based on the adverse inference.”48  
The plaintiff duly amended its claim to allege that the defendant’s 
conduct49 was “willful and wanton” and entitled the plaintiff to 
punitive damages.50  
Similarly, in Coleman Holdings Inc. v. Morgan Stanley & Co., the 
defendant committed several discovery abuses.  It failed to cease 
the automatic annual overwriting of its emails for four years;51 cer-
tified to the court that its document production was complete, 
mere weeks after finding nearly 1500 unprocessed backup tapes 
that contained over 8000 unreviewed emails;52 and then further 
failed to produce an additional 738 backup tapes it later discov-
ered.53  The court granted an adverse inference instruction that the 
missing emails would have shown the defendant’s role in the al-
legedly fraudulent transaction that was the subject of the lawsuit, 
and permitted the plaintiff to “argue that [defendant’s] conceal-
ment of its role in the transaction is evidence of its malice or evil 
intent, going to the issue of punitive damages.”54  The plaintiff took 
                                                     
45 No. 06-cv-02206-JLK, 2009 WL 482603 (D. Colo. Feb. 25, 2009) (describing a 
“systemic effort to erase pertinent data”). 
46 Id. at *8. 
47 Id. at *10. 
48 Id. at *11, *13. 
49 It is unclear whether the “conduct” referred to here was the underlying 
conduct of the defendant that was the subject of the lawsuit, or the conduct in 
wiping clean the hard drives. 
50 Complaint Amendment Regarding Claim for Punitive Damages at 1, Smith 
v. Slifer Smith & Frampton/Vail Associates Real Estate, LLC, No. 06-cv-02206-JLK 
(D. Colo. filed Mar. 9, 2009). 
51 Amended Order on Coleman (Parent) Holdings, Inc.’s Motion for Adverse 
Inference Instruction due to Morgan Stanley’s Destruction of E-Mails and Morgan 
Stanley’s Noncompliance with the Court’s April 26, 2004 Agreed Order, No. 
502003CA005045XXOCAL, 2005 WL 674485 at *2 (Fla. Cir. Cit. Mar. 1, 2005). 
52 Id. at *3. 
53 Id. 
54 Id. at *7 (internal citations omitted). 
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advantage of this opportunity, stressing in its closing argument to 
the jury, “Morgan Stanley hid evidence, Morgan Stanley destroyed 
evidence, Morgan Stanley filed false certifications, Morgan Stanley 
lied to the court and Morgan Stanley sought in every way possible 
to cover up its wrongdoing.”55  This strategy worked—the jury re-
turned a verdict for $850 million in punitive damages.56  Thus, an 
adverse inference instruction may allow the jury to infer conduct 
or culpability that subjects the party that withheld evidence to pu-
nitive damages.   
 
4.3  Reversibility 
 Finally, even if a non-producing party prevails before a jury, 
its victory may be reversed or vacated on appeal.  In Residential 
Funding Corp. v. DeGeorge Fin. Corp., the plaintiff received a jury 
verdict of $96.4 million, despite having failed to review 95% of 
emails from its backup tapes in time for trial.57  The trial court had 
not instructed the jury on any adverse inference, ruling that the 
plaintiff’s “purposeful sluggishness,” or negligence, in reviewing 
its emails did not call for a finding of spoliation and attendant 
sanctions (including an adverse inference instruction).58  The appel-
late court held that the district court misapplied the law on spolia-
tion.  It vacated the massive judgment, remanded the case for re-
hearing on the issue of spoliation, and instructed the district court 
to convene a new trial if it found that under the proper legal stand-
ard the plaintiff had spoliated.59  Thus, in litigation a non-
producing party has to persuade multiple judicial actors before it 
can fully benefit from its non-production.   
 
                                                     
55 Jill Barton, Jury Orders Firm to Pay Perelman $1.4 Billion: Morgan Stanley Cit-
ed for Fraud in Coleman Sale, WASH. POST, May 19, 2005, http://www.washing
tonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/05/18/AR2005051802207.html 
[https://perma.cc/EE9B-CFJ7].  
56 Id. 
57 306 F.3d 99, 105–06 (2d Cir. 2002). 
58 Id. 
59 Id. at 112.  The author has not been able to find records of the remanded 
proceedings, assuming any are available. 
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4.4 Observations on Litigation and Arbitration 
 
 At a glance, it seems that none of the three factors explored 
above that explain the potency of adverse inferences in litigation 
would pertain in arbitration.   
First, and most obviously, the judicial factfinder is not the arbi-
tral factfinder—an arbitral tribunal is not a jury.  It is composed, 
often, of lawyers60 who are trained in rules of evidence and thus 
can avoid making overbroad or prejudicial inferences.  Moreover, 
parties are more familiar with their arbitrators than they are with 
jurors, having interacted with the former throughout a multi-year 
proceeding, the latter during only a weeks-long trial.  Thus, arbi-
trators represent less of a frightening “black box” than jurors do.   
Second, international arbitral tribunals rarely award punitive 
damages, for a number of reasons.61  The parties to the arbitration 
may agree—or condition their consent to arbitrate on an agreement 
that—the tribunal may not award punitive damages.62  Indeed, the 
United States has conditioned its consent to arbitrate disputes with 
foreign investors on the investors’ agreeing to such a prohibition 
on punitive damages.63  Moreover, the procedural law governing 
the arbitral proceedings may be from a civil law country, where 
“punitive damages are generally not available.”64  Even if the law 
governing the arbitration provides for punitive damages, tribunals 
                                                     
60 See James E. Meason & Alison G. Smith, Non-Lawyers in International Com-
mercial Arbitration: Gathering Splinters on the Bench, 12 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 24, 26 
(1991–92) (citing a study that found that 83% of those appointed to international 
commercial arbitral tribunals in 1989 were lawyers). 
61 See Markus A. Petsche, Punitive Damages in International Commercial Arbitra-
tion:  Much Ado about Nothing?, 29 ARB. INT’L 89, 89 (2013) (stating that punitive 
damages awards are “quasi-inexistent” in international commercial arbitration). 
62 For example, investment treaties provide the substantive law governing 
disputes between foreign investors and host states, and simultaneously provide 
the host state’s consent to arbitrate such disputes.  Some of these treaties explicitly 
prohibit tribunals constituted under the treaty from awarding punitive damages.  
See, e.g., North American Free Trade Agreement, Can.–Mex.–U.S. art. 1135(3), Dec. 
17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 612, 107 Stat. 2057, 289 (1993) (“A Tribunal [constituted under 
this treaty] may not order a Party to pay punitive damages.”); see also Treaty Con-
cerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment art. 34(3), 
Rwanda–U.S., Feb. 19, 2008, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 110–23 (2010) (“A tribunal [consti-
tuted under this treaty] may not award punitive damages.”). 
63 See 2012 U.S. Model Bilateral Investment Treaty, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 
http://www.state.gov/ documents/organization/188371.pdf [https://perma.cc/
4KZ4-U6KR] (last visited Mar. 3, 2016) (providing in article 34(3) that “A Tribunal 
[constituted under this treaty] may not award punitive damages.”). 
64 Petsche, supra note 61, at 94. 
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may be reluctant to award them, because punitive damages may be 
against the public policy65 of civil law countries,66 and tribunals 
may not want to render an award of punitive damages that would 
be unenforceable in these countries.  For these reasons, treatises 
suggest that “arbitral tribunal should treat claims for punitive 
damages and other penalties with considerable caution.”67   
Third, as to reversibility, national courts may set aside68 or re-
fuse to enforce69 arbitral awards for a very limited set of reasons.  
None of these reasons permit a substantive review of the merits of 
the dispute.70  Thus, it seems unlikely that a court would set-aside 
or refuse to enforce an award on the grounds that the tribunal 
failed to draw an adverse inference during the arbitral proceed-
ings.   
Therefore, it may be hypothesized that the “in terrorem” effect 
of adverse inferences in litigation does not carry over to arbitration.  
The next Part tests this hypothesis, through an exploration of in-
vestor–state and commercial arbitration cases in which the tribunal 
warned a party that it may, or one of the parties asked the tribunal 
to, draw an adverse inference.71 
 
                                                     
65 See New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign 
Arbitral Awards art. V(2)(b), 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 38 (“Recognition and 
enforcement of an arbitral award may also be refused if the competent authority 
in the country where recognition and enforcement is sought finds that . . . [t]he 
recognition or enforcement of the award would be contrary to the public policy of 
that country.”). 
66 For example, one Swiss-seated tribunal refused a claim for punitive dam-
ages, because punitive damages were against Swiss public policy.  See ICC Case 
No. 5946 of 1990, 16 Y.B. COMM. ARB. 97 (1991) (ICC Int’l Ct. Arb.).  
67 NIGEL BLACKABY, ET AL., REDFERN AND HUNTER ON INTERNATIONAL 
ARBITRATION ¶ 9.50 (6th ed. 2015). 
68 See, e.g., UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, 
supra note 18, art. 34(2) (listing an exhaustive set of reasons for which a national 
court may set aside an arbitral award). 
69 See New York Convention, supra note 65, art. V (listing an exhaustive set of 
reasons for which a national court may refuse to enforce an arbitral award, which 
largely mirror those in the UNCITRAL Model Law). 
70 See GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION: LAW AND PRACTICE § 
17.04[E] (2nd ed. 2015) (“It is an almost sacrosanct principle of international arbi-
tration that courts will not review the substance of arbitrators’ decisions contained 
in foreign awards in recognition [or set-aside] proceedings.”). 
71 The number of cases that meet this criteria—that included a request for, or 
warning of, an adverse inference—is admittedly low.  However, this is the appro-
priate criteria, because parties in arbitration are not likely to produce damaging 
documents voluntarily.  See O’MALLEY, supra note 7. 
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5. ADVERSE INFERENCES IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 
 
The cases explored below validate the hypothesis.  The differ-
ences between arbitration and litigation did indeed remove the po-
tency of the tribunals’ adverse inference warning in the cases stud-
ied.  These differences are:  (A) the type of factfinder; (B) the 
absence of punishment; and (C) the finality of awards.   
 
5.1 Factfinder:  Arbitrators are not Jurors 
The factfinders in international arbitration—arbitrators—do not 
do as much damage with adverse inferences as the factfinders in 
litigation—juries—do.  Arbitrators make confined and narrow in-
ferences.  Moreover, they recognize that indirect evidence is insuf-
ficient to decide certain issues in international arbitration.  Finally, 
the parties’ familiarity with their arbitrators allows the parties to 
reasonably estimate the probability and severity of a potential ad-
verse inference, and decide accordingly whether or not to produce 
damaging evidence. 
   
5.1.1 Arbitrators’ Confined and Narrow Inferences 
 Arbitral tribunals do not draw the broad and potentially 
prejudicial inferences that juries draw.  Tribunals confine their in-
ferences to the specific issue to which the withheld evidence likely 
pertained, rather than inferring about the non-producing party’s 
whole case or culpable character.  Furthermore, even within the 
specific issue, arbitrators make narrow, rather than dispositive, in-
ferences.  Therefore, parties have refused to produce evidence, in 
breach of explicit orders from tribunals, and still gone on to win 
the arbitration.   
Two commercial arbitrations suggest that arbitrators confine 
their inferences to the issue at hand, rather than inferring more 
broadly about the non-producing party’s character or entire case.  
The first dispute, Agility Public Warehousing Co. K.S.C. v. Supreme 
Foodservice GMBH, involved two military contractors.72  Pursuant 
                                                     
72 See Declaration of Robert L. Begleiter at 25, Agility Pub. Warehousing Co. 
K.S.C. v. Supreme Food Service GmbH, 840 F. Supp. 2d 703, 2008 WL 8683417 
(S.D.N.Y. 2008) (No. 1:11-cv-07375-VM), Ex. 1B [hereinafter Agility Partial Final 
Award]. 
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to a contract concluded by the contractors, the claimant assisted the 
respondent to bid on, obtain, and perform a contract to supply 
food to American troops in Afghanistan.73  In return, the respond-
ent would pay the claimant a percentage of all net revenues it re-
ceived from its government contract for the duration of that con-
tract.74  The parties’ dispute initially centered on the definition of 
the term “net revenues.”75  However, during the proceedings the 
claimant was indicted for major fraud because it was found to have 
submitted false invoices with artificially low prices in its (success-
ful) bids for contracts to supply American troops in Iraq.76  The re-
spondent then amended its pleadings to add a claim for rescission, 
alleging that the claimant had fraudulently induced it to enter into 
their agreement by making promises that it intended to fulfill by 
illegal means.77  
The claimant informed the tribunal that given the indictment, 
four of its executives would exercise their Fifth Amendment rights 
and refuse to testify in the arbitral hearings,78 despite three sepa-
rate warnings by the tribunal that failure to produce these witness-
es may lead to adverse inferences being drawn against claimant.79  
The respondent proposed adverse inferences on both issues in dis-
pute.  First, “by failing to appear with witnesses to rebut the allega-
tions in the Indictment, PWC and PCA have effectively admitted 
the truth of those allegations”; second, since the absent witnesses 
were involved in the negotiation of the parties’ agreement, their 
absence “leaves unrebutted, and effectively admitted, [respond-
ent’s] testimony with regard to what the parties’ [sic] intended by 
the phrase ‘Net Revenues’.”80 
The tribunal made these inferences, but only these inferences.  
Regarding rescission, the tribunal noted that even if it did infer that 
the allegations in the indictment were true, the fact that the claim-
ant secured its Iraq contract with the American government by il-
legal means does not allow for the conclusion that it secured its 
                                                     
73 Id. at 3. 
74 Id. at 4. 
75 Id. at 14. 
76 Criminal Indictment at 10–11, United States v. Public Warehousing Com-
pany K.S.C. a/k/a Agility, 2011 WL 1126333 (No. 1:09-cr-490). 
77 Agility Partial Final Award, supra note 72, at 15 – 16. 
78 Id., Ex. 10. 
79 Id., Ex. 9 at 12. 
80 Id. at 20. 
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Afghanistan agreement with the respondent by illegal means.81  
The fact would connect to the conclusion only through a second in-
ference, one about the claimant’s character—that the claimant was 
deceptive in securing all of its transactions.  The tribunal refused to 
make this character inference; it even cited, but did not formally 
apply, American evidentiary rules prohibiting such an inference.82  
Regarding “net revenues,” the tribunal did infer that the absence of 
the claimant’s negotiators added support to the respondent’s tes-
timony, but still found for the claimant based on the “wealth of 
additional evidence” the claimant had presented, including from 
the respondent’s own files.83  Therefore, the tribunal limited its two 
inferences to the issues at hand; it did not make further inferences 
regarding the claimant’s character or its entire claim.   
The sole arbitrator in a Swiss-seated arbitration similarly re-
fused to make broad inferences regarding a person’s character or 
credibility based on the person’s conduct in an unrelated proceed-
ing.84  In that case, the claimant accused the respondent of forging 
an amendment to their contract for the delivery of goods.  A third 
country began a criminal investigation into the alleged forgery, 
and one of the respondent’s witnesses ignored subpoenas from 
that country’s authorities.85  However, the arbitrator refused to 
draw an adverse inference, because “this arbitration is separate 
from the criminal proceedings in the [investigating] country.  … 
Claimant asked that [the witness] appear before me, and he did 
that.  Claimant had full opportunity to examine [him], and so did 
I.”86  This reasoning parallels that in Agility: there, the tribunal de-
cided that a party’s conduct in an unrelated (Iraq) transaction did 
not bear upon its liability regarding the (Afghanistan) transaction 
at hand; here, the sole arbitrator decided that the witness’s behav-
ior in an unrelated (“separate”) legal proceeding did not bear upon 
the witness’s credibility in the proceeding at hand, which was to be 
determined by the witness’s testimony and response to cross-
examination.  In both cases, the arbitrators respected the separation 
between different issues.   
                                                     
81 Id. at 23 – 24, 33. 
82 Id. at 23 – 24 (citing FED. R. EVID. 404(b)(1)). 
83 Id. at 44. 
84 X. Firm v. Y. Ltd., ICC, Preliminary Award (Oct. 9, 2008), 29 ASA BULL. 860 
(2011). 
85 Id. ¶ 85. 
86 Id. ¶ 106 (emphasis added). 
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Moreover, even within a specific issue, arbitrators draw narrow 
inferences.  In United Postal Services (UPS) v. Canada, for example, 
the American investor claimed that Canada had breached its 
NAFTA national treatment obligations.87  It alleged that Canada 
had allowed domestic courier services access to the infrastructure 
of the national postal monopoly on preferential terms not available 
to foreign postal services, and that Canada provided the monopoly 
itself with subsidies, autonomy, and benefits that it did not provide 
to foreign postal services.88  UPS requested documents regarding 
these allegations, and Canada objected to production on grounds 
of cabinet privilege89 found in its domestic law.90  The tribunal re-
jected Canada’s privilege claims,91 and explicitly warned Canada 
that failure to disclose these documents may lead to the tribunal 
“drawing an adverse inference on the issue in question.”92  It reit-
erated its warning in a subsequent order.93  Canada did not pro-
duce the withheld documents, and even arguably relied on them in 
its counter-memorial.94  The investor therefore asked the tribunal 
                                                     
87 See generally United Parcel Servs. of Am., Inc. v. Gov’t of Can., Investor’s 
Memorial (Mar. 23, 2005), http://investorstatelawguide.com/—documents/
documents/UN-0027-75%20-%20UPS%20v.%20Canada%20-%20Claim%
20Memorial%20on%20Merits.pdf [https://perma.cc/RHM9-DP4V]. 
88 Id. at 46 – 121. 
89 See United Parcel Servs. of Am., Inc. v. Gov’t of Can., Decision of the Tri-
bunal Relating to Canada’s Claim of Cabinet Privilege (Oct. 8, 2004), 
http://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:iic/267-
2004.case.1/IIC267(2004)D.pdf [https://perma.cc/VQW5-PPZT] (“In Canada 
there is a prohibition that does not allow the disclosure of documents that are 
considered to be Cabinet confidences, namely documents that contain evidence of 
Ministers’ discussions and deliberative process.”). 
90 See Canada Evidence Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. C-5, § 39(1) (1985) (amended on 
Aug. 1, 2015) (“Where a minister of the Crown . . . objects to the disclosure of in-
formation before a court, person or body with jurisdiction to compel the produc-
tion of information by certifying in writing that the information constitutes a con-
fidence of the Queen’s Privy Council for Canada, disclosure of the information 
shall be refused without examination or hearing of the information by the court, 
person or body.”). 
91 See Decision of the Tribunal Relating to Canada’s Claim of Cabinet Privi-
lege, supra note 89, ¶ 13. 
92 Id. ¶ 15. 
93 United Parcel Servs. of Am., Inc. v. Gov’t of Can., Investor’s Memorial 
(Merits Phase) (Mar. 23, 2005) ¶ 400 & n.464, http://
www.naftaclaims.com/disputes/canada/ups/ups-71.pdf [https://perma.cc/
3UYC-5DQ4] (citing Procedural Direction of Dec. 17, 2004, ¶ 4). 
94 United Parcel Serv. of Am., Inc. v. Gov’t Can., Investor’s Reply (Aug. 15, 
2005) ¶ 374, http://naftaclaims.com/disputes/canada/ups/ups-74.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/KAD2-L656] (noting that Canada’s “ witnesses and experts 
repeatedly refer[red] to and rel[ied] upon such documents without attaching them 
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to infer essentially the truth of its allegations.95  
The tribunal made the adverse inferences, but still found for 
Canada, because the withheld documents allowed it to infer only 
that Canada treated the foreign investor differently than it treated 
its domestic courier services and postal monopoly.96  However, dif-
ferential treatment was only one required element of the investor’s 
claim: the investor also had to show that the foreign and domestic 
investors were “in like circumstances.”97  The tribunal concluded 
that neither the investor’s direct evidence, nor the indirect evidence 
of the withheld documents, could satisfy this requirement.98  The 
tribunal pointed to “inherent distinctions” between postal services 
and courier services,99 as well as between private postal companies 
and a national monopoly that has public service obligations.100  
Therefore, while the tribunal, as promised, made an adverse infer-
ence on “the issue in question” of national treatment, its inference 
narrowly targeted only one part of this issue.   
The tribunal was similarly precise in Glamis Gold v. United 
States of America.101  There, a Canadian mining company claimed 
that two acts by the State of California breached the United States’ 
obligation under NAFTA to provide fair and equitable treatment to 
investors.102  Specifically, California adopted an emergency admin-
istrative regulation that required mining companies to backfill 
completely their open-pit mines, and a subsequent law that formal-
ized these regulations.103  The investor alleged that these measures 
                                                                                                                        
as exhibits to their affidavits or filing them elsewhere in the record”). 
95 Id. ¶¶ 379 – 98. 
96 United Parcel Servs. of Am., Inc. v. Gov’t of Can., Award, Separate State-
ment of Dean Ronald A. Cass (June 11, 2007), ¶ 186, 
http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-
commerciaux/assets/pdfs/disp-diff/ups-00.pdf [https://perma.cc/9QQU-
VFLG]. 
97 North American Free Trade Agreement, supra note 62, art. 1102(1). 
98 United Parcel Servs. of Am., Inc. v. Gov’t of Can., Award (May 24, 2007), ¶ 
98, http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/
assets/pdfs/disp-diff/ups-00.pdf [https://perma.cc/9QQU-VFLG]. 
99 Id. 
100 Id. ¶ 138. 
101 See Glamis Gold, Ltd. v. U.S., Award (an arbitration under chapter 11 of 
the North American Free Trade Agreement, June 8, 2009), 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/125798.pdf [https://perma.cc/
G3TE-YR4T] [hereinafter Glamis Award] (targeting hypothetical adverse inference 
only to one part of the issue at stake). 
102 See North American Free Trade Agreement, supra note 62, art. 1105. 
103 Glamis Award, supra note 101, ¶¶ 166 – 78. 
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constituted unfair and inequitable treatment because they were 
“closely related acts with the same goal of halting [claimant’s] 
investment” in a politically controversial open-pit mine near a 
Native American site.104  At the end of voluminous document 
disclosure, the tribunal ordered the United States to produce six 
California legislative documents, which allegedly contained 
“communications between high-level executive branch agencies 
and the Governor’s office.”105  When the United States produced 
redacted versions of these documents, the claimant requested an 
adverse inference that the documents showed that the regulation 
and law were closely coordinated measures aiming to render its 
mine economically infeasible.106  
Skeptical that a smoking gun would exist within the “limited 
redactions” to the documents, the tribunal declined to draw an 
adverse inference.107  However, its implicit discussion of the 
adverse inference it would have drawn is instructive.  The tribunal 
said that even if the documents could show—in other words even 
if the tribunal had inferred—that the regulation and law were 
meant to “work[] together,” they could not show that they were 
meant to work together for the specific purpose of halting claimant’s 
project;108 the tribunal had earlier concluded that the regulation did 
not intend to target claimant’s mine, because it was of general 
application and had already been applied to another mine.109  
Thus, just like in UPS, the tribunal disaggregated the various parts 
of the issue to which the withheld evidence pertained (here, the 
collective intent of California’s two acts), and targeted its 
hypothetical adverse inference only to one part of the issue.   
Thus, arbitrators’ adverse inferences in the above four cases 
exhibited none of the terrifying aspects of the adverse inferences 
that juries draw.  Rather than concerning the withholding party’s 
character or entire case, the adverse inferences drawn by 
arbitrators concerned a specific issue.  And rather than disposing 
of this specific issue, they narrowly targeted a sub-issue within it.  
Such adverse inferences can hardly be said to “end arbitration” the 
                                                     
104 Id. ¶ 24. 
105 Glamis Gold, Ltd. v. U.S., Procedural Order No. 13, ¶ 13, 23(a) 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/110307.pdf [https://perma.cc/
9P8Q-9DLD]. 
106 Glamis Award, supra note 101, ¶ 252. 
107 Id. ¶ 822. 
108 Id. ¶ 820. 
109 Id.  
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same way they “end[] litigation”110; indeed, far from being de-
deterred from future non-production, all four non-producing 
parties in the above cases won.   
5.1.2  The Necessity of Direct Evidence 
A withholding party may also reasonably foresee that tribunals 
will be reluctant to decide jurisdictional issues against it based on 
indirect evidence.  Arbitrators derive jurisdiction only from the 
consent of the parties to the dispute.111  They may not want to 
assume jurisdiction without direct evidence of the parties’ consent, 
especially in investor-state arbitration where an erroneous 
assumption of arbitral jurisdiction violates a country’s 
sovereignty.112  For example, in OPIC Karimun Corp. v. Venezuela, 
the Panamanian claimant argued that Article 22 of Venezuela’s 
foreign investment law contained Venezuela’s consent to ICSID 
arbitration.113  That article provided that disputes “to which [is] 
applicable the [ICSID Convention], shall be submitted to 
international arbitration according to the terms of the respective 
treaty or agreement, if it so provides….”114  The claimant produced 
as a witness Venezuela’s former Permanent Representative to the 
UN Office and WTO, who had helped draft the law; he testified 
that the law was intended to establish consent to ICSID arbitration 
“even when there is no BIT in place,” and the “if it so provides” 
language was included only for drafting efficiency to avoid 
reproducing the language from arbitration clauses in treaties.115 
 Venezuela did not present any evidence to contradict the 
witness’s statement, despite several requests from the tribunal that 
                                                     
110 Laura Zubulake v. UBS Warburg, 220 F.R.D. 212, 219 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
111 BORN, supra note 70, at 5; see also Convention on the Settlement of Disputes 
Between States and Nationals of Other States art. 25(1), Mar. 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 
1270, 575 U.N.T.S. 159 (“The jurisdiction of the Centre shall extend to any legal 
dispute arising directly out of an investment . . . which the parties to the dispute 
consent in writing to submit to the Centre.” (emphasis added)). 
112 See AMCO v. Indon., ICSID Case No. ARB/81/1, Decision on Jurisdiction 
(Sept. 25, 1983), 1 ICSID Rep. 377, 393 (1993) (noting that a state derogates from its 
sovereignty when it agrees to arbitrate disputes with foreign investors). 
113 See ICSID Case No. ARB/10/14, Award (May 28, 2013), 
https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet? requestType=CasesRH&
actionVal=showDoc&docId=DC4552_En&caseId=C1101 [https://perma.cc/
84CD-HDBP].  There was no bilateral investment treaty in force between Vene-
zuela and Panama. 
114 Id. ¶ 66 (emphasis added). 
115 Id. ¶ 115. 
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it provide documents from the law’s legislative history.116  In fact, 
the tribunal during hearings extensively questioned Venezuela’s 
witness on whether Venezuelan law allowed the government to 
compel production of documents from former government 
employees, and why the government had not followed up with the 
former drafters of the law who refused to testify or provide 
documents.117  The tribunal made the adverse inference that the 
withheld documents “do not assist the Respondent in support of 
its arguments these proceedings,”118 but concluded that  
such inferences, however, fall well short of the direct 
evidence that would be needed to establish intent in the face 
of the ambiguities of the Investment Law . . . [I]nferences 
alone, absent direct evidence, are not sufficient to establish 
that Article 22 reflects an intention on the part of Venezuela 
to consent to ICSID jurisdiction, as required by Art.  25 [of 
the] ICSID Convention.119 
 
Thus, Venezuela ultimately profited from its disobedience of 
the tribunal’s orders.  It successfully exploited two facts: first, 
while the factfinding authority of jurors need not be established, 
the factfinding authority of arbitrators does; and second, this 
authority may not be established by proof that carries “reduced 
evidential weight,” such as indirect evidence in the form of adverse 
inferences.120  
 
5.1.3 Familiarity with the Tribunal 
 A party’s decision to obey the tribunal’s orders may also be 
influenced by its degree of familiarity with the tribunal.  While 
litigants do not get to know juries and thus have little sense as to 
how juries will exercise their discretion in drawing adverse 
inferences, parties to arbitration interact with the tribunal 
throughout the often multi-year arbitration.  As such, they may be 
able to foresee whether a tribunal is predisposed to draw any 
adverse inference against them, and how severe any inference 
                                                     
116 Id. ¶ 124. 
117 Id. ¶¶ 139 – 42. 
118 Id. ¶ 145. 
119 Id. ¶ 146 (emphases added). 
120 See Van Houtte, supra note 9. 
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would be. 
 A party that has prevailed in most of the tribunal’s previous 
interlocutory decisions may have less to fear than one to whom a 
newly constituted tribunal remains unknown.  For example, in 
Clayton v. Canada, the parties engaged in enormous document 
production and exchanged several privilege logs in a six-year long 
arbitration.121  The tribunal found for Canada in most of its 
evidentiary rulings: it found Canada’s privilege logs to be of 
sufficient detail, both for solicitor–client privilege122 and for 
political and institutional sensitivity;123 and it found that Canada 
had not waived its privilege through the inadvertent disclosure of 
forty-five documents.124  Near the end of document production, it 
ordered Canada to produce within thirty days any known relevant 
documents that were created after the arbitration began.125  Canada 
did not produce the documents, and the claimant asked for an 
adverse inference.126  The tribunal declined to draw one.127  Given 
the tribunal’s past favorable evidentiary decisions and the 
voluminous discovery Canada had already produced, it is 
plausible that Canada foresaw this outcome and therefore decided 
not to produce.  
 By contrast, in Biwater Gauff (Tanzania Ltd.) v. Tanzania, the 
tribunal ruled on Tanzania’s claims of “public interest immunity” 
only three months after it was constituted.128  It rejected Tanzania’s 
claims on two grounds: first, Article 54(5) of the Tanzanian 
Constitution, on which Tanzania based its immunity claims, did 
                                                     
121 See Clayton v. Gov’t of Can., UNCITRAL, Award on Jurisdiction and Lia-
bility, ¶¶ 52 – 83 (Mar. 17, 2015), http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-
agreements-accords-commerciaux/assets/pdfs/disp-diff/clayton-12.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/9TZR-9FZV]. 
122 See Clayton v. Gov’t of Can., Procedural Order No. 12, ¶ 33 (May 2, 2012), 
http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/assets/
pdfs/disp-diff/clayton-po-12.pdf [https://perma.cc/26R8-FQ2C]. 
123 See Clayton v. Gov’t of Can., Procedural Order No. 13, ¶ 34 (July 11, 2012), 
http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/assets/
pdfs/disp-diff/clayton-po-13.pdf [https://perma.cc/L5TC-MCSQ]. 
124 See Procedural Order No. 12, supra note 122, at ¶¶ 48 – 49. 
125 See Clayton v. Gov’t of Can., Procedural Order No. 14, ¶ 13(c) (Sept. 19, 
2012), http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/
assets/pdfs/disp-diff/clayton-po-14.pdf [https://perma.cc/U7JV-GWVK]. 
126 Clayton v. Gov’t of Can., Award, supra note 121, ¶ 88. 
127 Id. ¶ 118. 
128 ICSID Case No. ARB/05/22, Award, ¶¶ 27, 44 (July 24, 2008), 
http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0095.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/QN4G-ZAQC] [hereinafter Tanzania Award]. 
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not apply to the arbitral tribunal, because the constitutional provi-
provision forbade the disclosure of cabinet advice to any “court”;129 
second, even if Tanzania’s domestic law did apply, it would be 
subordinated to Tanzania’s bilateral investment treaty obligation to 
arbitrate investment disputes in good faith.130  Tanzania then did 
comply with the tribunal’s order to produce the documents for 
which it had unsuccessfully claimed immunity.131  It is plausible 
that Tanzania’s compliance was motivated by its unfamiliarity 
with the arbitrators and their approach to evidentiary rulings and 
sanctions.   
 Of course, parties gamble with tribunals, even familiar ones, 
at their own peril.  In a New York-seated commercial arbitration, 
the tribunal drew a dispositive adverse inference against the 
respondent, even though the respondent had, in the tribunal’s 
words, demonstrated “competence, professionalism, courtesy and 
good humor during the arbitration.”132  The dispute arose out of 
the parties’ manufacturing agreement, according to which the 
respondent would manufacture product x for the claimant using 
the latter’s technology.  The respondent agreed not to disclose the 
claimant’s technology to third parties or to use it for any purpose 
besides the agreed-upon manufacturing.  However, after some 
time the respondent obtained European and American patents for 
product x’, which was very similar to product x.  Since product x’ 
very likely contained the claimant’s technology, the claimant 
commenced arbitration, alleging breaches of the confidentiality 
clause in the manufacturing agreement.   
 The key issue in the dispute was when the respondent had 
started using the claimant’s technology to make x’, because after a 
certain date, the claimant’s technology became part of the public 
domain and was no longer protected by the manufacturing 
                                                     
129 Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania, 1977, art. 54(5) 
http://www.judiciary.go.tz/downloads/constitution.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/ZV2C-DD8T] (“The question whether any advice, and if so, 
what advice was given by the Cabinet to the President, shall not be inquired into 
[by] any court.” (emphasis added)) 
130 See Biwater Gauffe (Tanz.) Ltd. v. Tanz., Procedural Order No. 2, at 8 
(May 23, 2006), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/
ita0088.pdf [https://perma.cc/LG3E-YYR4]; see also Vienna Convention on the Law 
of Treaties art. 27, Jan. 27, 1980, 155 U.N.T.S. 331 (“A party may not invoke the 
provisions of its internal law as justifications for its failure to perform a treaty.”). 
131 Tanzania Award, supra note 128, ¶¶ 52 – 54. 
132 X firm (Belg.) v. Y firm (USA), ICC Case No. 8694, Award (1996), 124 J. DE 
DROIT INT’L 1056, 1059 (1997). 
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agreement.  However, the respondent refused to produce its work 
records or patent applications for x’.  The tribunal warned the 
respondent that this evidence was “of [paramount] importance to 
the crucial question of this arbitration,” and that intentional failure 
to produce it could lead to an adverse inference against the 
respondent.133  Once the respondent persisted in its refusal, the 
tribunal had “no hesitation” in inferring that the respondent began 
its work on x’ before the claimant’s manufacturing secrets became 
part of the public domain.134  Thus, while parties may feel less 
deterred from defying orders of a tribunal with which they are 
familiar and collegial, they do so at their own risk.   
 
5.2 The Absence of Punishment 
 Two investor–state cases suggest that neither a party’s 
egregious non-production, nor an adverse inference that it engaged 
in egregious conduct, will expose the party to punitive damages.  
In Pope Talbot v. Canada, Canada’s non-production itself may have 
been punishable.135  The claimant lumber company alleged that 
Canada breached its national treatment obligations under NAFTA, 
by allocating a higher quota of lumber to domestic than to foreign 
producers.136  The tribunal requested documents from Canada 
regarding how Canada calculated its lumber quotas.137  It denied 
Canada’s conclusory allegations that the requested documents 
were subject to a “cabinet confidence” privilege found in Section 
39(1) of the Canada Evidence Act.138  The tribunal based its denial 
on the same two arguments made by the Biwater Gauff tribunal,139 
but added a third important one:  allowing Canada to rely on a law 
that allowed it (but not the investor) to withhold documents on 
                                                     
133 Id. at 1058. 
134 Id. 
135 Pope Talbot Inc. v. Gov’t of Can., Award on the Merits of Phase 2, (Apr. 
10, 2001), 7 ICSID Rep. 102 (2005). 
136 Id. ¶¶ 33–104. 
137 Pope & Talbot Inc. v. Gov’t of Can., Interim Award, ¶¶ 41 – 44 (June 26, 
2000), 7 ICSID Rep. 69 (2005). 
138 Pope & Talbot Inc. v. Gov’t of Can., Decision by Tribunal, ¶ 1.3 (Sept. 6, 
2000), 7 ICSID Rep. 99 (2005). 
139 Namely, that the domestic law prohibited disclosure of documents to any 
“court,” but not necessarily to an arbitral tribunal, and that in any event this do-
mestic law was subordinated to Canada’s international obligations under NAFTA 
to cooperate in the arbitration.  See supra note 130. 
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mere assertions that they contain state secrets would violate the re-
requirement that parties in arbitration be treated with equality.140  
The tribunal thus ordered Canada either to produce the documents 
or to submit a detailed privilege log, and explicitly warned it of the 
possible adverse inference that would result if Canada did not 
comply with this order.141  Canada ultimately did neither.142 
 In its merits award, the tribunal found Canada in breach of 
its NAFTA obligation to provide fair and equitable treatment.  The 
tribunal did not find a breach of the obligation for national 
treatment, the issue to which the withheld documents pertained.  
Yet because it was able to find for the investor on the investor’s 
other claim, it concluded that Canada’s refusal to produce the 
documents “did not appear prejudicial to the Investor.”143  It 
deemed Canada’s conclusory reliance on its domestic law privilege 
to be “a derogation from the ‘overriding principle’…that all Parties 
should be treated with equality.”144  Since it did not have the 
authority under NAFTA to impose punitive damages on 
Canada,145 all the tribunal could do was “deplore[]” Canada’s 
refusal to produce the evidence.146  This reprimand evidently did 
not carry lasting reputational sting, as Canada’s lead counsel in the 
case went on to become Secretary-General of ICSID.147  
 Meanwhile, in Europe Cement v. Turkey the tribunal made an 
adverse inference that the claimant had engaged in arguably 
punishable conduct, but it did not punish claimant for this 
conduct.148  Seeking $3.8 billion in damages, the claimant alleged 
that Turkey expropriated the claimant’s investment in a local 
electricity supplier when Turkey terminated its concession 
                                                     
140 Decision by Tribunal, supra note 138, ¶ 1.5. 
141 Id. at ¶ 1.8. 
142 Pope & Talbot Inc. v. Gov’t of Can., UNCITRAL, Decision by Tribunal (II), 
¶ 1 (Sept. 27, 2000), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-
documents/ita0677.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q5RA-W65V]. 
143 Award on the Merits of Phase 2, supra note 136, ¶ 193. 
144 Id. 
145 North American Free Trade Agreement, supra note 62, art. 1135(3). 
146 Id. 
147 See Damon Vis-Dunbar, Meg Kinnear elected as Secretary-General of ICSID, 
INV. TREATY NEWS (Mar. 3, 2009), https://www.iisd.org/itn/2009/03/03/meg-
kinnear-elected-as-secretary-general-of-icsid/ [https://perma.cc/D5A5-SEHY]. 
148 See ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/07/2, Award (Aug. 13, 2009), 
http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0311.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/ZZY9-JP5U]. 
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agreement with the supplier.149  However, Turkey denied that the 
claimant had ever owned shares in the supplier, challenging the 
authenticity of the copies of share certificates that the claimant 
produced.150  The tribunal ordered the claimant to produce original 
certificates for forensic analysis,151 and warned that if the claimant 
failed to comply with the order, Turkey could advise the tribunal 
on adverse inferences.152  The claimant stated that it could not 
produce the shares due to its predecessor’s mismanagement of 
records, and asked the tribunal to dismiss its claim for lack of 
jurisdiction without prejudice.153  
Turkey also wanted the tribunal to dismiss the claim for lack of 
jurisdiction.154  However, it first wanted the tribunal to draw an 
adverse inference that the claimant could not produce the share 
certificates not because it could not find them, but because it never 
owned shares at all; in other words, Turkey asked the tribunal to 
infer that the claimant’s claim was fraudulent.155  It also sought 
compensation for the “moral damage” caused by the claimant’s 
abuse of process.156  The tribunal did infer that the claim was 
fraudulent,157 but did not order the claimant to pay any damages, 
compensatory or punitive.158  Thus, while Morgan Stanley paid 
dearly for its fraudulent conduct in litigation,159 Europe Cement 
did not similarly pay for its fraudulent conduct in arbitration.   
 
5.3 Finality of Arbitration Awards 
 
 Finally, while in litigation a party must persuade both a trial 
and appellate court that its decision not to produce evidence was 
proper, in arbitration a party speaks only to an audience of one 
tribunal.  Award debtors have been unsuccessful in persuading 
                                                     
149 Id. ¶ 26. 
150 Id. ¶ 15. 
151 Id. ¶ 32 (citing Procedural Order No. 3 of May 29, 2008). 
152 Id. ¶ 53 (citing Procedural Order No. 7 of Nov. 14, 2008). 
153 Id. ¶ 57. 
154 Id. ¶¶ 92 – 93. 
155 Id. ¶ 103. 
156 Id. ¶ 177. 
157 Id. ¶ 167. 
158 Id. ¶ 181. 
159 Supra notes 51 – 54 and accompanying text. 
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courts to review a tribunal’s failure to draw an adverse inference.160  
Even American courts, which were allowed under the “manifest 
disregard of the law” doctrine review a tribunal’s legal 
conclusions,161 have deemed tribunals’ decisions not to draw 
adverse inferences as unreviewable “factual conclusions.”162  
Therefore, a non-producing party is more likely to profit from its 
non-production in arbitration than it would be in litigation.   
 
6. CONCLUSION 
 The three factors that help adverse inferences deter parties 
from withholding evidence in litigation do not exist to the same 
extent in arbitration.  First, while a non-producing party in 
litigation runs the risk that a jury will infer the worst on a given 
issue or make inferences regarding the party’s whole case or 
character, a non-producing party in arbitration does not run this 
risk.  Arbitrators draw confined and narrow inferences, and are 
reluctant to decide certain jurisdictional issues based only on the 
indirect evidence of an adverse inference; moreover, parties can 
better predict whether their arbitrators will draw an adverse 
inference than whether their juries will, having interacted with the 
former over the course of an entire proceeding and the latter only 
during a trial at the end of litigation.  Second, while an adverse 
inference could lead to punitive damages in litigation, it likely will 
not in arbitration.  Third, a party’s non-production may threaten 
the survival of its favorable court judgment, but not of its favorable 
arbitral award.  These three differences have allowed parties to 
escape punishment and even liability in arbitration, despite having 
refused to aid the arbitral factfinding process.   
 Two compelling avenues for future study would further test 
the conclusions of this Comment empirically.  The first avenue 
would collect all publicly available court cases in which a party 
                                                     
160 See, e.g., Dongwoo Mann + Hummel Co Ltd v. Mann + Hummel GmbH 
[2008] 3 SLR(R) 871; [2008] SGHC 67 (Sing.) (2008) (“Dongwoo had the full oppor-
tunity to submit that an adverse inference ought to be drawn, but it failed to per-
suade the tribunal to draw the adverse inference.”). 
161 See Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(4) (2012) (allowing courts to 
vacate an arbitration award if the arbitrators “so imperfectly executed [their pow-
ers]”); see also Hall Street Associates, L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576 (2008) (inter-
preting the Federal Arbitration Act as allowing courts to vacate an arbitration 
award if the arbitrators “manifestly disregarded the law”). 
162 Page Int’l Ltd. v. Adam Mar. Corp., 53 F.Supp.2d. 591, 596, 598 (1999). 
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was warned that a potential adverse inference would be drawn 
against it, and determine in what percentage of those cases the 
warned party then produced the requested evidence; similar data 
would be collected for arbitrations;163 the two figures would then 
be compared to see if there was a statistically significant difference 
between them.  The second avenue would collect first-hand 
testimony from arbitration practitioners.  It would ask practitioners 
to share situations in which the threat of an adverse inference 
caused them to alter their production decisions.  Strengthening the 
impact of adverse inferences is crucial to ensuring that arbitrators 
successfully deter parties from withholding evidence, and can 
therefore produce the most informed awards possible. 
 
                                                     
163 Such a study would be subject to the limitation of the Priest–Klein effect:  
that is, such a study would not be representative of all litigations or arbitrations, 
because those judicial decisions or arbitral awards that are publicly available may 
differ systematically from those that are not (namely, those that are not known or 
that were settled).  The Priest–Klein effect is particularly pronounced in empirical 
studies about international commercial arbitration, because international com-
mercial arbitration awards typically are not publicly available.  See George L. 
Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 
(1984). 
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